veiled4allah: what direction for Saudi Arabia?

Saudi Arabian foreign policy has been guided by the singular overriding desire of regime continuity. In spite of its claims that it is an Islamic state, Saudi Arabia has remained consistently pragmatic and rational in foreign relations: It has not used Islam as a criterion for them, as Iran has. Saudi leaders have, however, used Islam as a legitimizing tool, first to boost their domestic constituency by building a strategic alliance with Wahhabi Islam, and then to court the global Muslim community with the expansion and lavish redecoration of the holy mosques in Mecca and Medina and the financing of Islamic projects worldwide.

The fervor of Islamic resurgence has led to a widespread call for regime changes in most of the Muslim World. Islamists have come to power in Iran and Sudan but have failed to everywhere else, with particular lack of success in Egypt and Algeria. Meanwhile the United States, in collaboration with Pakistan and the Saudis, has produced a new type of Islamic fighter, the modern mujahedin, to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan, and thus Bin Laden was created. After the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, this new breed of Islamic fighters turned to new battlefields. Some chose Kashmir and others chose Bosnia and Chechnya. But Bin Laden decided to go home and try to make Saudi Arabia a more Islamic state. The presence of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia, which is considered by many Muslims as off limits for non-Muslims, infuriated Bin Laden and acted as a catalyst to exacerbate the conflict between the kingdom and the prince of mujahedin. In the Saudi civil war that resulted, the United States took sides and has since worked to protect the regime from terrorists as well as other Arab threats, such as former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Over the years Islamists in Egypt, such as Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, Bin Laden's right-hand man and mentor, had concluded that Egypt could not be transformed as long as it enjoyed U.S. support. Bin Laden soon reached the same conclusion about Saudi Arabia.

Now the United States faces the daunting challenge of protecting as well as reforming Saudi Arabia. It needs the present regime to stabilize geopolitics and the oil economy. Regime change in Saudi Arabia could bring pro-Bin Laden forces to power. Maintaining status quo is also unacceptable because Sept. 11 happened as a result of existing conditions in the kingdom. Even though U.S. President George W. Bush has repeatedly proclaimed that his administration will go after all those who harbor and support terrorists and that he hopes to democratize the entire Middle East, it is generally understood that Saudi Arabia is excluded from both these measures. But the United Sates cannot continue to keep the Saudi Arabian issue on the back burner. There are many issues and questions with regards to Saudi Arabia; they cannot remain classified for long. If democracy will reduce terrorism, then we must talk democracy in Saudi Arabia. If liberal Islam promotes dialogue and co-existence, then we must help make the voices of liberal Muslims in the kingdom heard over the cacophony of the fatwa regime.

In the war on terror, the Saudi regime and the United States have common interests and common enemies. Perhaps a more open dialogue between the two will help them protect their interests. For their part, the Saudis have depended on two routes to security--the United States and Wahhabi Islam. Now both countries are at the crossroads.