From an article1:
This indicates that the London attackers were less sophisticated than the Madrid attackers, the Moroccan Islamic Combat Group, and may have a far looser connection (if any) to the al Qaeda leadership. The perpetrators are most likely to have been small in number and to have included one or more veterans from an overseas jihad, who imperfectly mimicked the tactics of the Madrid attack.
If this is accurate, it would underline al Qaeda's transition in the past four years towards a decentralized structure that has become increasingly dependent on local groups to carry out operations. Indeed, since the Afghan War in 2001, one of network's greatest assets has been its logistical and operational flexibility in having no state to defend, which affords it a flat, transnational and clandestine organizational scheme with minimal physical infrastructure.
The Madrid bombings had the consequence of bringing down then-Prime Minister José María Aznar's government and changing Spain's policy on Iraq. The London bombings do not appear to have been specifically intended to coerce U.K. policy in the same way as Iraqi kidnappings of citizens from countries that provide troops in Iraq. Even had they been intended to serve this purpose, it is unlikely that they could effect the calculus of the U.K. government, much as IRA attacks failed to effect U.K. policy despite about two dozen mainland bombings since 1974.
The U.K. is already committed to undertake a drawdown of forces in southern Iraq in 2005 and 2006 to aid the deployment in Afghanistan. The bombings may worsen U.K. public antipathy towards U.S. President George Bush's administration for its perceived role in drawing the U.K. into Iraq. Thus the bombings may make pro-U.S. positions harder for Tony Blair's government to sustain. (
link)
A very interesting analysis, worth reading in full.
Complete text of the article,
What The Bombings Mean , by Oxford Analytica
Comparisons have inevitably been drawn between yesterday's attacks in London and the ones in Madrid last March. However, the points of contrast indicate that a less-sophisticated group probably carried out yesterday's atrocities.
1. The Madrid attacks killed 191 people and injured a further 1,700, compared to the current total of more than 50 killed and 700 injured (including less than 200 seriously injured) in London.
2. Whereas the Madrid attacks involved 13 explosive devices and the use of powerful industrial explosives, the London atrocities appear to have used a far smaller number of less-powerful devices that appear to have been less-effectively placed.
3. The London attacks exploded within a 58-minute period, failing to achieve the near-simultaneity of the Madrid atrocities, which is a hallmark of operations by al Qaeda and its regional affiliates. Lacking simultaneity and taking place after the height of the morning rush hour, the attacks were apparently not timed to strike the largest concentrations of unsuspecting commuters.
4. The Madrid attacks targeted the densely packed commuter trains of the overland network because they offered a less-surveilled environment than the Madrid metro. By contrast, the terrorists in London struck the underground transport system, along with a bus, increasing the prospects of their eventual identification and apprehension.
This indicates that the London attackers were less sophisticated than the Madrid attackers, the Moroccan Islamic Combat Group, and may have a far looser connection (if any) to the al Qaeda leadership. The perpetrators are most likely to have been small in number and to have included one or more veterans from an overseas jihad, who imperfectly mimicked the tactics of the Madrid attack.
If this is accurate, it would underline al Qaeda's transition in the past four years towards a decentralized structure that has become increasingly dependent on local groups to carry out operations. Indeed, since the Afghan War in 2001, one of network's greatest assets has been its logistical and operational flexibility in having no state to defend, which affords it a flat, transnational and clandestine organizational scheme with minimal physical infrastructure.
The Madrid bombings had the consequence of bringing down then-Prime Minister José María Aznar's government and changing Spain's policy on Iraq. The London bombings do not appear to have been specifically intended to coerce U.K. policy in the same way as Iraqi kidnappings of citizens from countries that provide troops in Iraq. Even had they been intended to serve this purpose, it is unlikely that they could effect the calculus of the U.K. government, much as IRA attacks failed to effect U.K. policy despite about two dozen mainland bombings since 1974.
The U.K. is already committed to undertake a drawdown of forces in southern Iraq in 2005 and 2006 to aid the deployment in Afghanistan. The bombings may worsen U.K. public antipathy towards U.S. President George Bush's administration for its perceived role in drawing the U.K. into Iraq. Thus the bombings may make pro-U.S. positions harder for Tony Blair's government to sustain.
However, no major changes are likely in the U.K.'s role in the global "war on terror," although the attacks will add weight to the Blair government's ability to recommend "soft power" solutions to the root causes of terrorism. Taking steps towards resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a key element.
While another attack in the U.S. remains the key al Qaeda objective, the U.K. will continue to be a major target due to its close support of U.S. policy in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as its longer-term colonial legacy and immigration ties with many present-day Islamist recruiting grounds. The Blair government will intensify its efforts to include more soft power elements in the war on terror, but U.K. foreign and security policy, including that towards Iraq, is unlikely to be substantially altered by the bombings.
reference=http://www.forbes.com/business/2005/07/08/london-bombing-analysis-cx_oa_0708oxanbombings.html
The Clipboard: What The Bombings Mean